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ABSTRACT 
 
Competitors engage in product market predation when they lower prices or increase expenditures 
on nonprice competition with the goal of forcing a rival to exit. This study provides evidence that 
financially constrained firms avoid financial statement disclosure to mitigate predation risk. The 
empirical tests examine German private firms, most of which failed to comply with financial 
statement public disclosure requirements until an enforcement change increased noncompliance 
costs. The evidence shows more financially constrained firms were more likely to avoid 
disclosure until the change. Results from cross-sectional and supplemental analyses are 
consistent with predation risk driving this relation.  
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1. Introduction 
Competitors engage in product market predation (“predation”) when they lower prices or 
increase expenditures on nonprice competition with the goal of forcing a rival to exit. Prior 
research shows that firms prey to keep or attain market power, acquire competitors at lower cost, 
or deter current or future entrants, but do so only under certain conditions. For example, theory 
suggests that information asymmetries between potential prey and external parties, such as 
capital providers, can influence predation risk (e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). Anecdotal 
and archival evidence also suggests that prey tend to be financially constrained, in the sense that 
they lack financial resources to survive even short price wars or business downturns. Consider, 
for instance, the plight of Quidsi, parent of Diapers.com. Quidsi was founded in 2005 and grew 
to about $300 million in annual sales by 2010, thanks largely to its diaper business. At that point, 
Amazon.com sensed opportunity and slashed its diaper prices by a third. According to 
Bloomberg BusinessWeek, “Quidsi’s profitability sank, and [Quidsi] was forced to sell out to 
Amazon during the Great Recession, when additional capital to fund the fight was impossible to 
obtain.”1 
I examine evidence that financially constrained firms—those most vulnerable to 
predation—make disclosure decisions to preserve information asymmetries with potential 
predators to attempt to avoid fates like Quidsi’s. Financially constrained firms have incentives to 
avoid public disclosure of information that would help to resolve competitors’ uncertainty about 
the costs and benefits of predation. For example, without the financial disclosures of rivals, 
potential predators lack information about the financial resources, production capacity, and time 
needed for predation to be successful. Thus, just as some firms have incentives to withhold 
disclosure to avoid other proprietary costs, such as the threat of attracting a copycat into a 
                                                        
1
 Stone, Brad, “Wipe off that smile,” Bloomberg Businessweek, Jan. 12–18, 2015, p. 44. 
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profitable segment (e.g., Botosan and Stanford, 2005), some firms have incentives to avoid 
revealing information about performance or financial position to mitigate predation risk.  
 I test the effect of predation risk on disclosure decisions using data from German private 
firms following a 2006 regulatory change. Like most other European countries, Germany has 
required since the 1980s that all limited liability private firms publish certain annual financial 
statement information. However, unlike most other European countries, Germany essentially did 
not enforce the requirement for decades, and most firms did not comply. In 2006, under pressure 
from the European Commission, the German government finally implemented a strict 
enforcement regime, which made available financial statement information for firms that had 
long avoided disclosure (Henselmann and Kaya, 2009). I test whether the level of financial 
constraint helps explain the choice to avoid financial statement disclosure until this change.  
 This setting has several advantages. First, Germany requires all limited liability private 
firms to prepare full accounts for shareholders, regardless of public disclosure decisions (Kaya, 
2010), so it is implausible that firms avoided disclosure due to incremental accounting or agency 
costs (Berger, 2011; Vashishtha, 2014). Second, disclosure avoidance could substantially limit 
the financial information available to potential predators, given the lack of alternative 
information sources for private firms. Third, financial statement filings of private firms form the 
basis of tax returns in Germany (Eberhartinger, 1999; Eierle et al., 2007; Kaya, 2010; Szczesny 
and Valentinčič, 2013; Watrin et al., 2012), so the disclosures are likely to be reliable (Hanlon et 
al., 2014).  
 I hypothesize that the probability of disclosure avoidance before the enforcement change 
increases with financial constraint at an increasing rate, consistent with theory and evidence that 
predation risk is particularly high at the highest levels of financial constraint (Campello, 2006; 
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Opler and Titman, 1994). I measure financial constraint using industry-adjusted book leverage 
net of cash, based on evidence that financial constraint increases with observable leverage ratios 
and decreases with cash holdings (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). By adjusting the book 
leverage of the firm (net of cash) by the industry average, I isolate within-industry (i.e., relative-
to-rivals) differences in financial constraint (e.g., Campello, 2006). The results show financial 
constraint has a strong positive relation with disclosure avoidance and this relation is greater at 
higher levels of constraint. Estimated marginal effects show the relation is economically 
significant compared to other determinants of disclosure avoidance previously studied, such as 
profitability (e.g., Dedman and Lennox, 2009).  
 I also conduct several cross-sectional tests based on evidence that predation risk is a 
function of firm and industry characteristics in addition to financial constraint. Prior work shows 
that easier access to external financing (for the predator) can facilitate predation (e.g., Bolton et 
al., 2000), so predation risk is likely to be higher in industries with a public rival. Prior papers 
also suggest that predation risk is greater for firms that do not rely on ex ante sales contracts and 
for firms smaller or less profitable than rivals (Burns, 1986; Chevalier, 1995; Scott Morton, 
1997; Weiman and Levin, 1994). The results of the tests provide evidence consistent with these 
predictions. Overall, the findings suggest that the strength of the link between financial 
constraint and disclosure avoidance depends on factors related to predation risk but less clearly 
related to potential alternative explanations, such as nondisclosure to hide financial constraints 
from other firm counterparties, like suppliers or customers.  
 Finally, I conduct a series of supplemental analyses to corroborate my interpretation of 
the findings. A falsification test in the spirit of Badertscher et al. (2013) shows that the results do 
not extend to the UK, which did not tighten enforcement in 2006. Consistent with firms using 
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disclosure decisions to mitigate competitive threats, I also find that more financially constrained 
German private firms delayed public disclosure during the implementation of the new regime. I 
likewise find that the relation between subsequent firm performance (e.g., changes in market 
share) and financial constraint is generally more negative for German firms that previously 
avoided disclosure compared to those that did disclose or similar UK firms. These results are 
consistent with the enforcement change facilitating predation and provide evidence on the real 
effects of German private firms’ disclosure decisions (e.g., Shroff et al., 2014).  
This study contributes to two bodies of literature. First, it provides evidence of a 
proprietary cost of disclosure fundamentally different from those previously examined. Whereas 
prior papers show that firms avoid disclosures to thwart product copycats or hide information 
about customers and material contracts (e.g., Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Ellis et al., 2012; 
Verrecchia and Weber, 2006), I present evidence that suggests financing characteristics 
constitute important proprietary information due to predation risk. The evidence also suggests 
that the relation between profitability and proprietary costs depends on the firm’s financial 
constraint and challenges the notion that disclosure of negative information does not impose 
proprietary costs (Bens et al., 2011; Tang, 2012). These findings are likely to matter to managers 
and regulators concerned about the competitive implications of mandatory disclosure regimes. 
Second, this paper adds to the literature on product market predation. Theory suggests 
information asymmetries between potential prey and external parties, including capital providers, 
can affect predation risk (e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). I provide evidence that private 
firms can withhold financial disclosures to raise rivals’ uncertainty about the costs and benefits 
of predation. These results complement prior findings suggesting that firms also make financing 
and hedging decisions to mitigate predation risk (Haushalter et al., 2007).  
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2. Mandatory disclosure regime in Germany 
  Under German law, limited liability private firms have been required to publicly disclose 
certain annual financial statement information since 1987, consistent with European Commission 
Directives on firm disclosure (namely, the 1968 and 2003 EU Corporate Disclosure Directives). 
When these requirements were adopted, the responsibility to monitor compliance was delegated 
to local courts. However, the courts in Germany failed to impose effective penalties for 
noncompliance, which led most firms to ignore the requirement (e.g., Henselmann and Kaya, 
2009). 
 Events in the late-1990s and mid-2000s pressured the German government to address the 
systematic non-compliance with public disclosure requirements. In a court case decided in 
December 1997 (CASE C-97/96), the European Court of Justice ruled that Germany had failed 
to implement an effective system of sanctions to ensure compliance with EU public disclosure 
requirements. A statement by the European Commission in September 1998 (CASE C-191/95) 
similarly concluded that the German government had failed to meet its EU obligations. In 2003, 
the European Commission mandated all European firms make their annual financial statements 
available as electronic filings at a national register beginning January 1, 2007.  
In April 2005, the German government introduced the draft bill for the law that became 
known as “EHUG” (Electronic Commercial and Company Registrar, Gesetz über elektronische 
Handelsregister und Genossenschaftsregister sowie das Unternehmensregister). It proposed 
central monitoring of financial statement filings and the imposition of substantial penalties for 
failure to comply with disclosure requirements (Bernard et al., 2016). The EHUG bill was 
debated and revised before being enacted in November 2006, and the enforcement regime 
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became effective for fiscal years ending December 31, 2006, and later. Figure 1 presents a 
timeline of events affecting German private firms’ public disclosure requirements since 1987.  
<FIGURE 1> 
The passage of EHUG changed the de facto voluntary disclosure regime into a mandatory 
one. Before the change, the cost of avoiding disclosure was relatively low, and financially 
constrained firms that feared predation could withhold financial statements that would have 
revealed crucial information. In contrast, after the change in enforcement, the substantial 
penalties made noncompliance prohibitively costly for most firms, which led to increased 
compliance. Thus, by comparing the previously unobservable characteristics of firms that did not 
disclose before the passage of EHUG against those that did disclose, I can test whether high 
levels of financial constraint relate to decisions to withhold financial disclosures. 
3. Hypothesis development 
3.1. Predation risk, financial constraint, and disclosure avoidance 
Competitors engage in predation when they lower prices or increase expenditures on 
nonprice competition with the goal of forcing a rival to exit.
2
 Exit does not necessarily entail 
bankruptcy or liquidation—it can also take other forms such as abandoning a specific product 
market or the sale of the firm to the predator (e.g., Burns, 1986). Additionally, my definition of 
predation does not limit its scope to competition among established firms. For example, the 
analytical literature considers predation by established firms on potential entrants (e.g., 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986), and an entrant may exploit an incumbent’s financial constraint to 
rapidly establish itself in an industry.  
                                                        
2
 This definition of predation follows Fudenberg and Tirole (1986). Other papers and court rulings use a variety of 
definitions, but these alternatives often reflect specific characteristics or mechanisms of predation (e.g., Haushalter 
et al., 2007; Ordover and Willig, 1981; Scharfstein, 1984). I make no prediction regarding how predation happens in 
my setting, so I follow a definition of predation generally inclusive of other definitions. 
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The literature mainly focuses on firm characteristics and industry conditions that 
facilitate predation. For example, Chevalier (1995) finds evidence that supermarkets that recently 
underwent leveraged buyouts (LBOs) are often undercut on prices and forced to exit local 
markets if rivals are relatively unlevered. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) argue that firms can 
become financially constrained and targeted for predation even absent major leveraging events or 
economic shocks (i.e., predation occurs even in equilibrium). They model the firm’s optimal 
managerial contract and show that investors can mitigate incentive problems by providing 
funding in stages and committing to terminate funding if firm performance falters. The 
disadvantage is that the financial constraints imposed by the contract give rivals the incentive to 
prey and ensure the firm’s performance is poor. Their model also implies that firms and their 
capital providers are more likely to contract to alleviate financing constraints when an external 
shock increases predation risk. Haushalter et al. (2007) provide empirical evidence consistent 
with this idea; they show that firms build cash holdings and take derivative positions to ensure 
key investments can be financed internally under the threat of predation.
3
  
Managers likely make disclosure decisions partly to lower predation risk. Financial 
statement disclosures contain reliable information that can inform competitors about the costs 
and benefits of predation. The income statement and balance sheet set forth the firm’s size, 
leverage, liquidity, and operating performance, all of which are determinants of financial 
constraint and therefore vulnerability to predation (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). By withholding 
disclosures, then, firms can raise a potential predator’s uncertainty about the efficacy of a 
predatory product market strategy, including the financial resources, production capacity, and 
                                                        
3
 Predators could be better off buying their prey rather than preying (e.g., Bolton et al., 2000), particularly to the 
extent firms manage predation risk. However, not all prey are willing to sell, especially if the managers obtain some 
private benefits of control. Purchasing competitors can also attract new entrants similarly hoping to be bought out. 
This reasoning is sometimes used to explain why, at the turn of the 20
th
 century, American Tobacco Company 
preyed on rivals to reduce their value before purchasing them (Burns, 1986). 
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time needed for predation to be successful. In this way, disclosure avoidance can act as a wedge 
between rivals, and potential predators may lose the ability to reliably identify vulnerable prey. 
Of course, the incentive to withhold disclosure depends on the critical assumption that the 
act of nondisclosure does not itself signal the firm’s type. In essence, this condition requires that 
some managers have incentives to avoid disclosure for reasons unrelated to the threat of 
predation; otherwise, nondisclosure would fully inform competitors. Ex ante, this condition is 
likely to be satisfied, as prior literature suggests that firms withhold information for many 
reasons, such as to avoid drawing copycats into profitable product markets.
4
 
Thus, I predict that financially constrained German private firms were likely to “stay 
dark” until penalties for nondisclosure began to be enforced in 2006.5 Specifically, the threat of 
predation suggests that financial constraint relates positively to disclosure avoidance, where the 
strength of the relation increases at higher levels of constraint. This prediction is based on theory 
and prior empirical evidence that the risk of predation is relatively low for firms with low to 
moderate levels of constraint but pronounced for those with high levels of constraint; the most 
constrained firms have exhausted their borrowing capacity and are most susceptible to conflicts 
between managers and capital providers (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Campello, 2006; Opler 
and Titman, 1994).   
This leads to my first hypothesis, in alternative form:  
                                                        
4
 For example, Dedman and Lennox (2009) examine the propensity for medium-sized UK private firms to withhold 
sales and cost of goods sold disclosure. They find that better performing firms—those with higher gross profit 
margins—are less likely to disclose, consistent with a competitive incentive for some firms to avoid revealing 
“strength.” In contrast, the threat of predation generally provides a competitive incentive for some firms to avoid 
revealing “weakness.” 
5
 Not all firms avoided disclosure prior to EHUG (Henselmann and Kaya, 2009). Reasons for voluntary disclosure 
by private firms include idiosyncratic factors (e.g., a manager’s belief that disclosure is “good policy”) and 
contracting incentives (Dedman and Lennox, 2009). For example, although information can be disclosed to 
counterparties through private channels, which in principle avoids disclosure to competitors, firms whose size or 
business models lead them to contract with large numbers of counterparties may simply choose to publicly disclose 
information due to the volume of “confidential” disclosures.  
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H1a: Firms that are more financially constrained are more likely to avoid public 
disclosure of financial statement information. 
 
H1b: The relation between financial constraint and disclosure avoidance is more positive 
at higher levels of financial constraint.  
 
3.2. Cross-sectional evidence of predation risk on disclosure decisions 
Several firm and industry characteristics are likely to moderate the relation between 
financial constraint and disclosure avoidance. Although these firm and industry characteristics 
are closely related to predation risk, they are less clearly related to alternative explanations for 
the association between financial constraint and disclosure avoidance, as discussed below. 
3.2.1. Relative size  
Size relative to rivals partially determines susceptibility to predation. Preying on a larger 
rival is relatively costly and less likely to succeed, as larger firms typically have more diverse 
operations and more financial flexibility than small firms (e.g., Hadlock and Pierce, 2010).
6
 In 
contrast, prior literature shows that large firms prey on small rivals to acquire them more 
cheaply, undermine their growth, force price accommodation, capture additional market power, 
or deter product market entry (Bolton et al., 2000; Burns, 1986; Chevalier, 1995; Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1982; Weiman and Levin, 1994). These factors suggest that the risk of predation and 
therefore the probability of disclosure avoidance is concentrated among firms smaller than 
industry rivals.
7
  
This leads to my second hypothesis, in alternative form: 
H2: The relation between financial constraint and disclosure avoidance is more positive 
for firms smaller than industry rivals. 
                                                        
6
 Although production capacity and financing constraints impede a small firm’s ability to prey on a large rival, small 
firms could collude to drive a large competitor out of business. However, collusion is difficult to achieve and 
maintain. See Porter (2005) for a review of the problems inherent in collusive arrangements. 
7
 This prediction is consistent with the view of antitrust authorities, who often note that predation is a widespread 
concern among firms with larger, more dominant rivals. For instance, in a review of competition in the fuel sector in 
2011, Germany’s antitrust authority noted that the issue of predatory pricing “is a pressing one for small and 
medium-sized oil companies” (Bundeskartellamt, 2011).  
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3.2.2. Relative operating profitability  
Less profitable firms are also more susceptible to predation, as they are less likely to 
generate cash flows sufficient to finance investments internally or meet debt obligations. 
Likewise, firms that are merely less profitable than industry rivals are susceptible, as they are 
typically higher-cost producers. Thus, the positive relation between profitability and disclosure 
avoidance documented previously is likely to be concentrated among firms facing little threat of 
predation (e.g., Dedman and Lennox, 2009). That is, while highly profitable firms are more 
likely to avoid disclosure than unprofitable firms, this effect is likely to be diminished or 
reversed among financially constrained firms, as unprofitable and financially constrained firms 
are particularly vulnerable to predation.  
This leads to my third hypothesis, in alternative form: 
H3: The relation between financial constraint and disclosure avoidance is more positive 
for firms less profitable than industry rivals.  
 
3.2.3. Public firm presence  
Public firm presence is likely to be associated with greater predation risk for two reasons. 
First, cheaper and easier access to financing is critical to facilitate predation (e.g., Bolton et al., 
2000; Chevalier, 1995), so private firms are likely to be more vulnerable to predation by public 
competitors, which have on average lower debt levels than private firms and face lower absolute 
costs when accessing external capital markets (Brav, 2009).  
Second, firms are sensitive to industry uncertainty, as a lack of information about rivals’ 
financing and investment decisions makes the outcomes of their own decisions less certain (Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994). As a result, the more opaque the information environment of an industry, 
the more firms hold back on potential investment opportunities. For the same reasons, industry 
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uncertainty is likely to mute the propensity to engage in predation—a firm will not prey unless 
its managers are reasonably certain to eventually recoup the costs of predation (Bolton et al., 
2000). In this context, public firms can enrich an industry’s information environment and thereby 
facilitate predation. Consistent with this, Badertscher et al. (2013) present evidence that the 
availability of public firm disclosures reduces industry uncertainty and improves the 
responsiveness of other firms’ investment decisions to potential investment opportunities.  
This leads to my fourth hypothesis, in alternative form: 
H4: The relation between financial constraint and disclosure avoidance is more positive 
for firms in industries with public rivals.  
 
3.2.4. Ex ante sales contracting  
The characteristics of sales contracting constitute another dimension of industry 
competition likely to affect the risk of predation. In particular, the use of ex ante sales 
contracts—that is, those signed in advance of production and delivery—mitigate the risk of 
predation. These contracts reduce the net benefits of predation by giving prey more time to raise 
capital or take other actions to stave off predators. For example, a price war immediately 
undercuts a firm (such as a supermarket) that relies primarily on ad hoc sales, but the effect is 
delayed for a firm (such as a parts supplier for an airplane manufacturer) that has secured key 
contracts in advance. 
Long-term supply contracts are a subset of ex ante sales contracts particularly likely to 
mitigate the risk of predation. A customer is unlikely to break a long-term contract with its 
supplier unless the predator offers substantially better prices or terms of trade, which would per 
se erode the benefit of predation. Scott Morton (1997) makes a similar point about the role of 
supply contracts in mitigating predation risk facing product market entrants: “Contracts secured 
by an entrant before entry will make a … price war less effective in reducing an entrant’s 
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financial resources, and therefore longer, less likely to succeed, and less likely to be 
undertaken… [E]ntrants with contracts should not be preyed upon” (p. 701).  
This leads to my fifth and final hypothesis, in alternative form: 
H5: The relation between financial constraint and disclosure avoidance is more positive 
for firms in industries where the use of ex ante sales contracting is less common.  
 
4. Empirical methodology 
 I model disclosure avoidance using data drawn from Amadeus, a Bureau van Dijk 
database widely used in studies of both public and private European firms (e.g., Burgstahler et 
al., 2006). All independent variables are measured as of the firm’s fiscal year ending between 
December 31, 2006, and December 30, 2007—the first annual period after the new enforcement 
regime took effect and financial statement data became available for most firms. Thus, the values 
of industry and firm characteristics in the first year following the enforcement change are used as 
proxies for these characteristics in earlier years when managers chose whether to avoid 
disclosure. This approach benefits from the high level of persistence of most variables studied in 
prior papers on disclosure avoidance. For example, book leverage is highly persistent for public 
firms and even more so for private firms (Brav, 2009; Lemmon et al., 2008), so the firm’s 
leverage in 2006 or 2007 is likely to closely approximate its leverage during earlier periods. 
  Equation (1) presents the primary model specification: 
(1) No disclosure = f (
β0 + β1 × Industry– adjusted leverage net of cash
+ β2 × Industry– adjusted leverage net of cash
2 + Controls + ε
). 
 
I proxy for the firm’s decision to not disclose before the enforcement change using an indicator 
variable that equals one if the firm first appears in the Amadeus database for its fiscal year-end 
between December 31, 2005, and December 30, 2006 or December 31, 2006, and December 30, 
2007, and zero otherwise. Although the new enforcement regime did not take effect until fiscal 
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years ending December 31, 2006, or later, the number of observations on Amadeus increases 
substantially from calendar year 2004 to calendar year 2005 and again from calendar year 2005 
to 2006 (see Table 3 Panel B in Bernard et al., 2015). Since private firms have up to 12 months 
after the end of the fiscal year to file annual accounts under the German Commercial Code 
(Section 325), most firms were still within the filing deadline for their 2005 accounts when 
EHUG was passed in November 2006 (e.g., Bauer and Bigus, 2014). Thus, the increase in 
compliance between 2004 and 2005 suggests that many firms filed 2005 accounts once it became 
apparent that disclosure requirements would be enforced. As a result, firms that first filed either 
2005 or 2006 accounts are classified as disclosure avoiders.
8
 
I proxy for financial constraint using the industry-adjusted book leverage of the firm net 
of cash holdings (that is, the firm’s total debt net of cash, scaled by the firm’s total assets, minus 
the average of this ratio for all firms in the same four-digit NAICS code). A number of results in 
prior work motivate this proxy. First, there is robust, consistent evidence that, on average, a 
firm’s observable leverage positively relates to its financial constraint, incremental to the effect 
of several other determinants, such as size, operating performance, and firm age. Although some 
prior papers form linear combinations of these firm-level variables to measure financial 
constraint (e.g., Whited and Wu, 2006), I do not, because some variables necessary to construct 
these measures (such as Tobin’s Q) are unavailable for the firms in my sample. Nonetheless, I 
note that prior archival, survey, and analytical papers underscore leverage as a key determinant 
of financial constraint. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) find that it 
strongly positively relates to the probability that public firm managers make qualitative 
disclosures in SEC filings indicating financial constraint, and Lamont et al. (2001) and Whited 
                                                        
8
 The main results are robust to an alternative specification for which only firms that delayed filing until fiscal years 
ending between December 31, 2006, and December 30, 2007, are classified as disclosure avoiders. 
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and Wu (2006) positively weight it in constructing parsimonious models of financial constraint. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) likewise show that managers view financial flexibility as decreasing 
with debt. In a similar vein, several analytical papers suggest that high levels of leverage impede 
a firm’s willingness to invest due to the debt overhang problem (e.g., Myers, 1977).9  
Second, by deducting cash holdings from the total debt of the firm, the measure accounts 
for prior evidence that cash holdings reduce the firm’s financial constraint (Fresard, 2010; 
Haushalter et al., 2007; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Third, by adjusting the book leverage of the 
firm (net of cash) by the industry average, I subtract industry-level factors that could account for 
cross-sectional differences in leverage ratios and cash holdings. This approach is consistent with 
papers that study the interaction of capital structure and product markets (e.g., Campello, 2006) 
as well as the intuition that rivals’ financing decisions partially determine financial constraint.  
 As with all other continuous variables included in the empirical tests, industry-adjusted 
leverage net of cash is winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles to minimize the influence of 
outliers and then standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 
Standardizing the continuous variables allows for easier comparison across regression 
coefficients. Hypotheses 1a and 1b predict the coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are significantly positive. 
Equation (1) also includes variables to control for other benefits and costs of disclosure. I 
control for the firm’s relative operating profitability using its industry-adjusted operating return 
on assets (i.e., operating earnings scaled by total assets, minus the average of this ratio for all 
firms in the same four-digit NAICS code). This measure is included to account for evidence that, 
on average, better performing firms face greater proprietary costs of financial statement 
                                                        
9
 Prior papers also provide evidence that predation risk increases with the leverage of the firm relative to rivals 
(Chevalier, 1995; Lerner, 1995; Zingales, 1998). However, these studies do not explicitly show that financial 
constraint is the mechanism for this relation. 
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disclosure (Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Dedman and Lennox, 2009). Controlling for relative 
operating profitability is also important given the strong negative relation between leverage and 
operating performance documented in the capital structure literature (e.g., Lemmon et al., 2008). 
To proxy for the higher proprietary costs faced by firms that depend more on patents, licenses, 
customer lists, and other intangible assets (Ellis et al., 2012), I also control for the firm’s level of 
intangibility using the book value of intangible assets scaled by total assets. 
 I include controls for two potentially important dimensions of industry competition—
public firm presence and market concentration. I proxy for the presence of a public rival using an 
indicator variable that equals one if there is at least one public German company in the firm’s 
four-digit NAICS code. This measure is intended to account for (1) the presence of competitors 
with fewer financing frictions than private firms (Brav, 2009) and (2) higher investment 
sensitivity in the industry (Badertscher et al., 2013). I include the measure of public firm 
presence as a main effect (as well as an interactive effect in the cross-sectional tests below) 
because greater investment sensitivity plausibly raises proprietary costs of disclosure across all 
firms.  
To control for market concentration, I construct the Herfindahl-Hirschman index formed 
by four-digit NAICS code using total assets of German firms with publicly disclosed financial 
statement information (i.e., including private limited liability companies and public firms). I use 
total assets instead of sales because small and medium-sized private firms in Germany are not 
required to disclose sales. Ali et al. (2009) show that incorporating private firm data is critical to 
proxy for market concentration, consistent with the importance of private firms to economic 
activity in the US and Europe (Allee and Yohn, 2009; Badertscher et al., 2013; Minnis, 2011). 
Nonetheless, measures of market concentration are controversial in studies of proprietary 
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disclosure costs for a number of conceptual and empirical reasons (Dedman and Lennox, 2009; 
Lang and Sul, 2014), so I include the measure mainly for completeness and make no prediction 
on its directional effect. 
 The remaining controls include a measure of firm size, the natural log of total assets, as 
larger firms are likely to have more counterparties, which reduces the likelihood that information 
disclosed in contracting remains proprietary (Dedman and Lennox, 2009). I control for the 
effects of high labor law enforcement using an indicator variable that equals one for firms in 
industries that may face additional pressure to publicly disclose due to greater regulatory scrutiny 
under German labor laws and zero otherwise.
10
 I also include an indicator variable that equals 
one if the firm fails to report sales and zero otherwise, as medium-sized German firms that 
choose to not report sales reveal a preference for nondisclosure. Missing sales data can reflect 
certain proprietary disclosure costs and other costs of disclosure that the setting does not fully 
rule out, such as the personal or social preference of an owner-manager to publicly disclose as 
little as possible. Finally, I include (1) an indicator variable that equals one (zero) for firms in the 
former East (West) Germany, to control for potential historical differences in disclosure 
avoidance between the two regions; (2) a control for the 2006 mean disposable income (in 
thousands) of the district in which the firm is located to account for differences in economic 
development across Germany; and (3) a control for the year the firm was incorporated to account 
for the fact that older firms are better known (Dedman and Lennox, 2009).
11
 
                                                        
10
 This control variable equals one for firms in the forestry, construction, transportation, hospitality, animal 
processing, and facilities-services industries—that is, firms in three-digit NAICS codes 113, 236, 237, 238, 481, 
482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 721, and 722, as well as four-digit NAICS codes 3116, 5612, and 5617. 
Historically, German firms in these industries have been more likely to employ “undocumented” or “informal” labor 
(ILO, 2009). 
11
 Although the proxies for relative operating profitability, size, and firm age are intended to capture important costs 
or benefits of disclosure unrelated to predation risk, some papers provide evidence that these variables are 
systematically associated with financial constraint (e.g., Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). As a result, these proxies may 
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5. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
5.1. Sample selection 
 I select observations of German firms on Amadeus with fiscal year-ends between 
December 31, 2006, and December 30, 2007—the first annual period the EHUG enforcement 
regime was in effect. I exclude nonlimited liability legal forms, as public disclosure requirements 
generally do not apply to them, and I exclude observations without basic data on the firm’s 
industry (NAICS code), location, or year of incorporation.  
 I exclude firms that report total assets less than or equal to €4,015,000, the bright-line 
asset size threshold separating small from medium firms under German law in 2006 and 2007 
(see appendix). Small private firms in Germany are not required to be audited or disclose income 
statement information, but medium and large private firms must be audited and disclose at least 
some income statement information. Thus, this selection choice (1) increases the probability that 
the disclosures in the sample are audited and reliable and (2) ensures that tiny firms with limited 
public disclosure requirements do not drive the results.  
 Finally, I exclude observations missing financial statement data necessary for the 
empirical tests as well as firms incorporated in 2005 or later. The latter requirement ensures that 
all firms in the sample were required to file financials at least once before the implementation of 
EHUG. Table 1 shows that these sample selection criteria yield a final sample of 31,305 firm 
observations.
12
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
not capture distinct constructs. However, it is not clear how this limitation could provide an alternative explanation 
for the paper’s primary findings.  
12
 Bureau van Dijk deletes all firm-year observations on Amadeus for firms that fail to file financial statements for 
four consecutive years (e.g., because the firms went bankrupt and liquidated). These deletions are unlikely to explain 
the paper’s findings, given that I examine disclosure decisions of firms before the enforcement change conditional 
on each firm’s inclusion in the dataset for its fiscal year-end between December 31, 2006, and December 30, 2007. 
That is, while it is likely that more financially constrained firms are missing from the dataset to the extent high 
financial constraint is associated with bankruptcy, it is not clear how this lack of data availability would induce the 
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<TABLE 1> 
5.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows basic descriptive statistics for the final sample. Panel A presents the mean 
level of disclosure avoidance before the enforcement change and the number of observations in 
the final sample by industry (two-digit NAICS code). Panel B presents summary statistics on the 
independent variables, including the continuous variables before they are each standardized to 
have a mean equal to zero and standard deviation equal to one. Panel C presents summary 
statistics on the continuous variables after standardization. Panel D presents Pearson correlations. 
<TABLE 2> 
The results in Panel A show that while 55% of firms did not disclose before the change in 
enforcement, the level of disclosure avoidance varies considerably across industries, ranging 
from a low of 28% for utilities to a high of 62% for retailers. The results in Panels B and C 
highlight substantial variation in the independent variables. The interquartile range of industry-
adjusted leverage net of cash is 0.39,
13
 and the interquartile range of industry-adjusted ROA is 
0.12 (that is, 12%). The statistics also show that at least 90% of firms in the sample were 
incorporated by 2002, suggesting the vast majority faced nominal public disclosure requirements 
for multiple years before the enforcement change. Finally, the results in Panel D show a 
relatively strong negative correlation (−0.21) between industry-adjusted ROA and industry-
adjusted leverage net of cash, a result that is broadly consistent with evidence in the capital 
structure literature that operating performance and leverage are negatively related (e.g., Myers, 
1993). 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
empirical relations I predict for firms that are in the dataset for fiscal year-ends between December 31, 2006, and 
December 30, 2007. 
13
 The mean of book leverage net of cash, without industry adjustment, is approximately 0.59 (untabulated), 
consistent with prior evidence that private firms are relatively more levered than public firms (Brav, 2009). 
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6. Results 
6.1. Determinants of disclosure avoidance (H1) 
 Table 3 presents the results of estimating Equation (1) using ordinary least squares. I use 
a linear probability model so the model coefficients presented throughout the paper are 
interpretable as marginal effects (see e.g., Ai and Norton, 2003), though the results are 
inferentially identical when I use a binary (e.g., probit) model instead. Columns 1–3 exclude the 
squared leverage term that is included in columns 4–6. Columns 1 and 4 exclude all control 
variables, columns 2 and 5 include all control variables except those that plausibly reflect 
proprietary disclosure costs, and columns 3 and 6 include the complete set of control variables. 
<TABLE 3> 
The results present consistent, significant evidence that financial constraint has a positive 
quadratic relation with disclosure avoidance, consistent with H1a and H1b. Table 3 shows that 
the coefficients on the linear and quadratic terms for industry-adjusted leverage net of cash are 
positive and statistically significant in each of the models, and the results are generally more 
significant when control variables are added.  
Figure 2 plots estimated margins and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for [–3 
standard deviations, +3 standard deviations] of financial constraint based on the estimation of 
Equation (1) in Table 3, column 6. The results suggest that moving from –1 standard deviation of 
financial constraint (mean financial constraint) to +1 standard deviation of financial constraint 
(+2 standard deviations of financial constraint) results in a roughly 3.7 (8.3) percentage point 
increase in the likelihood of prior disclosure avoidance.  
<FIGURE 2> 
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Figure 3 provides a visual representation of the estimated margins and corresponding 
95% confidence intervals for [–3 standard deviations, +3 standard deviations] of four control 
variables (relative operating profitability, intangibility, market concentration, and firm size) that 
are widely studied in prior literature on proprietary disclosure costs (Bens et al., 2011; Botosan 
and Stanford, 2005; Dedman and Lennox, 2009; Ellis et al., 2012). Based on the estimation of 
Equation (1) in Table 3, column 6, a two standard deviation increase in relative operating 
profitability (intangibility) increases the likelihood of disclosure avoidance by 3.3 (1.5) 
percentage points, whereas a two standard deviation increase in market concentration (firm size) 
decreases the likelihood of disclosure avoidance by 2.0 (8.0) percentage points. Overall, the 
effect of financial constraint on disclosure avoidance appears to be economically significant. 
<FIGURE 3> 
The coefficient estimates on the remaining control variables in Table 3 are mostly 
consistent with my predictions. I find that firms in industries subject to greater regulatory 
scrutiny under German labor laws are less likely to have avoided disclosure, while, in contrast, 
firms that do not disclose sales and those that incorporated more recently are more likely to have 
avoided disclosure. Interestingly, the results also show that East German firms are significantly 
less likely than West German firms to have avoided disclosure, even after controlling for average 
income by district.
14
  
6.2. Cross-sectional evidence of predation risk on disclosure decisions (H2–H5) 
Equation (2) is used to test hypotheses 2–5: 
                                                        
14
 The results in Section 6.1. remain significant and consistent with H1a and H1b when (1) disclosure avoidance is 
modeled using either a logit model or a probit model (using either average marginal effects or marginal effects “at 
means”), (2) financial and public administration firms are dropped from the sample, (3) industry-adjusted leverage 
net of cash is truncated instead of winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles, (4) industry level is defined using three-
digit NAICS codes instead of four-digit NAICS codes, (5) industry fixed effects or quadratic terms for operating 
profitability or size are included in the model, (6) cash holdings are not subtracted from total debt in forming 
industry-adjusted leverage net of cash, (7) the sample is limited to firms without a consolidation companion on 
Amadeus, or (8) standard errors are clustered at the four-digit NAICS industry level.  
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(2) No disclosure = f (+
β0 + β1 × Industry– adjusted leverage net of cash
 β2 × Industry‒ adjusted leverage net of cash × CS variable 
+ Controls + ε
). 
 
There are two differences between Equation (1) and Equation (2). First, I drop the quadratic term 
for industry-adjusted leverage net of cash from the specification to avoid including interactions 
with quadratic terms. Including these interactions would force the relation between financial 
constraint and disclosure avoidance to be quadratic, even at representative values of the cross-
sectional variables where I do not expect the relation to be quadratic (e.g., for firms substantially 
larger than rivals).  
Second, I add the interaction of industry-adjusted leverage net of cash with cross-
sectional variables that proxy for relative size (industry-adjusted natural log of total assets), 
relative operating profitability (industry-adjusted ROA), public firm presence (public rival), or 
the propensity for ex ante sales contracting (ex ante contracting). The interactive effects of each 
of these variables with industry-adjusted leverage net of cash test H2–H5. Industry-adjusted 
ROA and public rival are defined as in Equation (1), and industry-adjusted natural log of total 
assets is the natural log of total assets minus the average of this variable by four-digit NAICS 
code. Ex ante contracting equals one for firms in manufacturing industries (NAICS codes 31–33) 
that produce “differentiated products” based on the product homogeneity classification scheme 
in Rauch (1999) and zero otherwise. This proxy for the propensity to rely on ex ante sales 
contracts is based partly on the work of Rajgopal et al. (2003) and Costello (2013), who show 
that order backlog and long-term supply contracts are particularly common among 
manufacturing firms. Rajgopal et al. (2003) show that more than 80% of firms with order 
backlog disclosures are manufacturers, and Costello (2013) shows that manufacturers make up 
roughly 69% of her sample of long-term supply contracts, even though they only constitute 
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roughly 28% of the Compustat universe.
15
 Nonetheless, because the propensity for ex ante sales 
contracting is likely muted for firms that produce more homogenous goods, ex ante contracting 
equals one only for manufacturing firms whose goods are not reference priced either in trade 
journals or on organized exchanges.
16
 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating Equation (2), where, due to the inclusion of the 
interactions, I make no prediction regarding the sign of the main effect of financial constraint. 
For expositional convenience, I focus the discussion on Figure 4, where I plot estimated margins 
and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for [–3 standard deviations, +3 standard deviations] 
of financial constraint at representative values of the cross-sectional variables, based on the 
estimates presented in columns 1–4 in Table 4. For the tests of H2 (Panel A) and H3 (Panel B), I 
separately plot estimated margins at the 10
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles of relative size and relative 
operating profitability, respectively. For the test of H4 (Panel C), I separately plot estimated 
margins for firms without and with public rivals. For the test of H5 (Panel D), I separately plot 
estimated margins based on the firm’s propensity to rely on ex ante sales contracts. 
<TABLE 4> 
The results plotted in Figure 4 are strongly consistent with hypotheses H2–H5. Panel A 
shows that the positive relation between financial constraint and disclosure avoidance is 
concentrated among firms that are smaller than rivals; this result is consistent with prior findings 
                                                        
15
 Long-term contracting is especially common among German manufacturers. For example, Lane and Bachman 
(1996) examine contracting in Britain and Germany in two manufacturing industries. They write: “[I]n Germany, 
long-term relations with customers and suppliers are the rule. … German managers not only show a stronger 
commitment to long-term relationships, but are also significantly more likely to enter into long-term contracts.” 
Burchell and Wilkinson (1997) reach a similar conclusion, noting that “security, strategic reasons, specific 
investment and the exchange of confidential information” are motives for long-term relations in Germany. 
16
 Rauch (1999) classifies traded goods as “differentiated,” “reference priced,” or “homogenous” separately by SITC 
code. Because the mapping between SITC codes and NAICS codes is not one to one, I approximate the level of 
product homogeneity for each NAICS code by assigning a value of two to SITC codes with “homogeneous” goods, 
a value of one to SITC codes with goods that are “reference priced,” and a value of zero to “differentiated” goods. I 
then find the median value across the SITC codes that correspond to each NAICS code (based on the “conservative” 
classification scheme in Rauch (1999)). Ex ante contracting equals one for manufacturers for which this median 
value equals zero. 
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that relatively small firms are more common targets for predation, ceteris paribus (e.g., 
Chevalier, 1995; Scott Morton, 1997). Panel B provides evidence that, consistent with prior 
work, the proprietary costs of disclosure for more profitable firms are greater, on average, than 
those for less profitable ones (e.g., Dedman and Lennox, 2009). However, Panel B also shows 
the probability of disclosure avoidance is not statistically different among relatively profitable 
and relatively unprofitable firms at high levels of financial constraint, consistent with predation 
risk imposing additional costs of disclosure for relatively unprofitable firms with high levels of 
financial constraint.
17
 Panel C shows that the effect of financial constraint on disclosure 
avoidance is stronger in industries that include at least one public firm, consistent with higher 
predation risk in industries with (1) at least one relatively sophisticated rival with easier access to 
external financing (Brav, 2009) and (2) lower investment uncertainty (Badertscher et al., 2013). 
Finally, Panel D shows that the positive relation between disclosure avoidance and financial 
constraint is muted among firms that are more likely to rely on ex ante sales contracts. This result 
is consistent with the idea that ex ante contracting can discourage predation (e.g., Scott Morton, 
1997).  
In column 5 of Table 4, I include all four of the interactions in a single regression to test 
whether any cross-sectional effect is subsumed by the others. The coefficients on all of the 
interactions remain significant in the predicted direction. 
<FIGURE 4> 
                                                        
17
 In untabulated tests, I examine the importance of the relative-to-rival adjustments to the empirical tests of H2 and 
H3. Specifically, I add the interaction of industry-adjusted leverage net of cash and the natural log of total assets to 
the estimation in Table 4, column 1, and the interaction of industry-adjusted leverage net of cash and ROA to the 
estimation in Table 4, column 2, where ROA equals the firm’s operating profits, scaled by total assets, without 
industry adjustment. The interactions of industry-adjusted leverage net of cash with industry-adjusted natural log of 
total assets and industry-adjusted ROA remain negative and statistically significant (p < 0.01, p < 0.10, respectively) 
in these alternative specifications. 
 
 
24 
6.3. Supplemental tests 
6.3.1. First disclosure and the determinants of disclosure avoidance 
If firms subject to high levels of predation risk postponed disclosure during the 
implementation of the EHUG enforcement regime, then firms that first filed for their fiscal years 
ending between December 31, 2006, and December 30, 2007, should have higher levels of 
financial constraint than firms that first filed for their fiscal years ending between December 31, 
2005, and December 30, 2006, all else equal. However, a potential limitation of tests of this 
prediction is that the firms that postponed as long as possible were also most likely to take 
financing actions to reduce their financial constraint and thereby mitigate predation risk 
(Haushalter et al., 2007).  
In column 1 of Table 5, Equation (1) is re-estimated excluding firms that first file 
December 31, 2006–December 30, 2007; in column 2, the equation is re-estimated excluding 
firms that first file December 31, 2005–December 30, 2006. Thus, whereas column 1 compares 
the characteristics of firms that first file December 31, 2005–December 30, 2006 against those 
that did not avoid disclosure, column 2 compares the characteristics of firms that first file 
December 31, 2006–December 30, 2007 against those that did not avoid disclosure. As expected, 
the coefficients on the linear and quadratic terms for industry-adjusted leverage net of cash are 
positive and significant in both estimations. I use chi-square tests to examine the equality of 
these coefficients between the two estimations. While the coefficient on the linear term for 
industry-adjusted leverage net of cash is not statistically different between estimations (p = 0.45), 
the coefficient on the quadratic term is significantly larger in column 2 than column 1 (p < 0.01), 
consistent with the most financially constrained firms postponing disclosure when EHUG was 
initially implemented.  
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<TABLE 5> 
6.3.2. Dimensions of market structure and disclosure avoidance 
Consistent with prior work, I expect at least two dimensions of industry market structure 
affect predation risk. The first is product substitutability. High levels of substitutability can lower 
the costs of preying, as firms in industries with high product substitutability can simply cut prices 
to capture business from a competitor. In contrast, firms need to make a variety of specific 
investments in intellectual property, machinery and other equipment, human capital, sales 
relationships, and other factors to prey on the producer of a highly differentiated product. This 
intuition is supported by prior evidence that suggests that predation risk is higher when firms 
have more similar operations and share growth opportunities (Haushalter et al., 2007). Thus, I 
expect the relation between disclosure avoidance and financial constraint is stronger in industries 
with higher levels of substitutability. 
The second dimension of market structure is the cost of entry. High costs of entry can 
raise predation risk, as predation is more likely when entrants cannot easily compete away 
abnormal profits that a firm might earn after preying on rivals (Bolton et al., 2000; Ordover and 
Willig, 1981). To the extent predation is predominately motivated by incentives to build and 
maintain market power (as opposed to, say, acquire rivals at lower cost), the relation between 
disclosure avoidance and financial constraint should be stronger in industries with higher costs of 
entry. 
Because sales data are not available for many of the sample firms, I calculate an adjusted 
form of the Lerner index to proxy for product substitutability. Specifically, I proxy for product 
substitutability as the negative of the weighted-average operating return on assets of firms by 
four-digit NAICS code, where weights are based on firm size (total assets). I proxy for costs of 
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entry as the weighted-average capital intensity of firms by four-digit NAICS code, calculated as 
the weighted-average ratio of fixed assets to total assets.
18
 I then separately estimate Equation (2) 
using the proxies for substitutability and costs of entry as cross-sectional variables.  
The results are presented (with coefficients on the control variables omitted for brevity) 
in Table 6. I find that the interaction of substitutability and industry-adjusted leverage net of cash 
is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01), consistent with a stronger relation between 
disclosure avoidance and financial constraint in industries with higher substitutability. I also find 
that the interaction of cost of entry and industry-adjusted leverage net of cash is positive and 
statistically significant (p < 0.05), consistent with a stronger relation between disclosure 
avoidance and financial constraint in industries with greater costs of entry. To test the robustness 
of these results, I add both interactions to the model estimated in Table 4, column 5. I find that 
the interaction of substitutability and industry-adjusted leverage net of cash remains significantly 
positive, the interaction of cost of entry and industry-adjusted leverage net of cash becomes 
statistically insignificant, and the interactions of the main cross-sectional variables (discussed in 
Section 3.2.) with industry-adjusted leverage net of cash remain significant in the predicted 
directions. 
<TABLE 6> 
6.3.3. Financial constraint, disclosure avoidance, and ex post performance 
Although the empirical analyses above examine evidence of disclosure avoidance to 
mitigate predation risk, it is also possible to examine evidence of predation after the “forced” 
disclosure of private firm financial statements. I emphasize ex ante evidence in the main analyses 
for two reasons. First, even a small risk of predation could lead an owner-manager to avoid 
                                                        
18
 See Bens et al. (2011) and Karuna (2007) for similarly constructed measures of product substitutability and costs 
of entry. Results are not sensitive to using the log of the average level of fixed assets by four-digit NAICS code as 
an alternative proxy for costs of entry. 
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disclosure, so the rate of predation is likely to be lower (and more difficult to detect) than the rate 
of disclosure avoidance to mitigate this risk. Second, the timing of the enforcement change in 
Germany means that evidence of predation necessarily coincides with the 2008 financial crisis 
and ensuing recession. Differentiating predatory effects from the effects of the broader downturn 
is empirically challenging. The tests below should be interpreted accordingly.  
To examine ex post evidence of predation, I estimate the following equation using 
ordinary least squares: 
(3) Ex post performance = f (
β0 + β1 × Industry– adjusted leverage net of cash
+ β2 × Industry– adjusted leverage net of cash × No disclosure
+ β3 × No disclosure + Controls + ε
). 
 
I consider four measures of performance: an indicator variable equal to one if the firm remains 
on the Amadeus database in the post period and zero otherwise, the percentage change in cash 
holdings, the percentage change in fixed assets, and the percentage change in industry market 
share (measured based on total assets and four-digit NAICS codes). These proxies capture 
changes in observable performance along multiple dimensions examined in the predation 
literature, including the firm’s liquidity, capital base, and market share (e.g., Campello, 2006; 
Chevalier, 1995; Haushalter et al., 2007). I include the binary survival proxy to capture the most 
extreme outcomes of predation (i.e., bankruptcy and liquidation), although I caution that the 
measure is imperfect—other factors, such as legal form changes, can also cause a firm’s 
subsequent exclusion from the Amadeus database. Each variable is measured between the firm’s 
filing between December 31, 2006, and December 30, 2007, and its filing (or lack thereof) two 
or three years later, and each continuous dependent variable is replaced with its decile rank to 
minimize the effects of outliers.
19
 The control variables in Equation (3) include measures of the 
                                                        
19
 The German accounting literature shows that most firms wait as long as possible (that is, 12 months after fiscal 
year-end) to disclose (e.g., Bauer and Bigus, 2014; Kaya, 2010). Indeed, some firms incurred significant penalties to 
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firm’s size (the natural log of total assets), year incorporated, and tangibility, which equals the 
ratio of fixed assets to total assets (e.g., Zingales, 1998). The controls also include an indicator 
variable that equals one for firms with negative operating profitability and the mean disposable 
income of the district in which the firm is located.  
The primary empirical prediction is 𝛽2 < 0. Financial constraint should be more 
negatively associated with the probability of survival and changes in liquidity, capital base, and 
market share for firms that previously avoided disclosure due to predation risk. Table 7 presents 
the results of this analysis. The estimated coefficients on the interactions of industry-adjusted 
leverage net of cash and no disclosure are negative and statistically significant for at least one 
period for three of the four measures. Overall, the results are consistent with greater decreases in 
liquidity, fixed assets (e.g., due to asset dispositions), and market share for more constrained 
firms that first disclose their financials due to the enforcement change. However, there is no 
evidence that the survival rate is lower for more financially constrained firms that previously 
avoided disclosure compared to those that previously disclosed. This result could reflect the fact 
that predation results in a variety of outcomes (market share losses, exit from a specific segment, 
etc.), where bankruptcy is the most extreme and likely the least frequent. The null result could 
also stem from error in measuring failure based on data availability in the Amadeus database or 
noise introduced by the effects of the financial crisis and recession. 
<TABLE 7> 
The analyses provide several other interesting results. First, I find that the main effect of 
disclosure avoidance is negative and significant (i.e., 𝛽3 < 0) in the survival, fixed asset, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
delay disclosure even beyond the 12-month filing deadline after the EHUG enforcement regime began (e.g., 
Henselmann and Kaya, 2009). Because competitors cannot observe the firm’s financial information for at least one 
year after the fiscal year-end, ex post measures of performance cover the two or three years following the 
enforcement change (see e.g., Zingales, 1998). 
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market share tests, consistent with mandated disclosure imposing proprietary costs on disclosing 
firms. These costs could include predation to the extent predation facilitated by the enforcement 
change does not strictly target more financially constrained firms. Second, I find that, while 
financial constraint has a significantly negative relation with survival and changes in fixed assets 
and market share (e.g., Zingales, 1998), it has a significantly positive relation with changes in 
cash holdings. This result is consistent with more financially constrained firms (specifically, 
those that did not go bankrupt or leave the sample for other reasons) using asset sales and other 
capital sources to raise cash in response to the crisis.  
Finally, in untabulated tests, I use UK limited liability firms as an alternative control 
group in Equation (3); that is, I use them in place of German private firms that disclosed before 
the enforcement change. I replace no disclosure in Equation (3) with UK firm, an indicator 
variable for UK limited liability firms that meet analogous sample selection criteria as those 
required for German limited liability firms in the main analyses. I find that the results are 
generally stronger when I use this alternative control group. Indeed, the interaction of UK firm 
and industry-adjusted leverage net of cash is positive and statistically significant for each 
dependent variable and ex post period examined in Table 7. Though these results should be 
interpreted with caution due to differences in capital financing practices and economic conditions 
between the UK and Germany, they are consistent with the relation between financial constraint 
and ex post performance being worse for German firms that previously avoided disclosure than 
otherwise similar UK firms, which did not face a change in disclosure enforcement. 
6.4. Discussion of alternative interpretations 
My results show financial constraint is positively associated with disclosure avoidance 
and this relation is generally stronger for firms with characteristics that reflect higher levels of 
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predation risk. Together with the results of the supplemental tests, this evidence suggests the risk 
of predation makes disclosure more costly for financially constrained firms. However, I 
acknowledge that alternative interpretations of the evidence cannot be fully ruled out.  
One possible alternative interpretation is that the relation between financial constraint and 
disclosure avoidance is due, at least in part, to a change in data coverage on Amadeus roughly 
concurrent with the enforcement change. If a change in data coverage is systematically 
associated with certain firm characteristics (such as financial constraint), the tests could conflate 
disclosure avoidance with a lack of database coverage. To address this possibility, I conduct a 
falsification test in the spirit of Badertscher et al. (2013) and estimate an analog of Equation (1) 
for UK limited liability private firms. Mandatory disclosure requirements have been enforced in 
the UK since the 1960s. If there had been a change in data coverage on Amadeus between 2004 
and 2006, presumably it would not have been limited to German firms. After imposing selection 
criteria for UK private firms analogous to those for German firms, I obtain a sample of 38,532 
observations. Untabulated results show that prior disclosure avoidance is extremely uncommon 
among UK private firms and has no significant relation with financial constraint.
20
 
Alternatively, industry-adjusted leverage net of cash may be capturing a construct other 
than financial constraint—observable leverage ratios are endogenous and reflect a variety of 
characteristics related to a firm’s borrowing capacity (e.g., Lemmon et al., 2008). However, it is 
not clear which alternative construct the proxy captures if not financial constraint, particularly 
given the cross-sectional evidence that suggests the relation between disclosure avoidance and 
                                                        
20
 Articles in the German accounting literature that use data directly from commercial registers also show that 
compliance with public disclosure requirements in Germany was minimal (approximately 10%) before the 
enforcement change, but improved dramatically (to approximately 90%) thereafter (e.g., Henselmann and Kaya, 
2009). These proportions of compliance map closely to the increase in available observations on Amadeus in 2004 
versus 2006 and onward (see Table 3 Panel B in Bernard et al., 2015), suggesting that the improved data availability 
is primarily due to firms’ improved compliance with public disclosure requirements, not a decision by Amadeus to 
dramatically change its data coverage. 
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financial constraint depends strongly on other factors that also determine predation risk. The 
proxy also relates negatively to several performance outcomes, including the probability of 
survival and changes in market share. These results are consistent with industry-adjusted 
leverage net of cash capturing a firm’s financial constraint, on average. 
Another possibility is that managers of financially constrained firms avoid public 
disclosure to external parties other than competitors. Perhaps managers try to hide negative 
information about performance or financial position from counterparties, consistent with 
evidence that high levels of indebtedness worsen terms of trade and deter customers 
(Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Opler and Titman, 1994). Although this explanation could 
partly explain the relation between disclosure avoidance and financial constraint, there are three 
reasons to doubt that it is the dominant effect. First, some counterparties, such as employees 
represented by a works council, have well-enforced information rights under German law, so 
they are unlikely to rely on public disclosures. Second, it is unclear why firms with public 
competitors would be significantly more likely to try to hide bad news from counterparties. 
Third, high levels of financial constraint can raise contracting costs even if a firm withholds 
disclosure. It is unlikely that a rational counterparty, such as a creditor, would enter a material 
contract without first obtaining assurances regarding the firm’s financial health. Similarly, a 
counterparty is likely to demand periodic assurances regarding the firm’s financial health to 
mitigate risks of moral hazard. If a firm chooses to avoid public disclosure, its counterparties are 
likely to demand private disclosure, and the firm’s refusal to privately provide financial 
information or other assurances would itself be informative (e.g., Grossman, 1981).  
Other alternative explanations include the possibility that managers of constrained firms 
were simply too busy ensuring their firms’ survival to comply with unenforced disclosure 
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requirements. This explanation is inconsistent with highly profitable firms being more likely to 
avoid disclosure and is difficult to reconcile with the cross-sectional tests. The relation between 
financial constraint and disclosure avoidance could also reflect the broad result in the literature 
that poorly performing firms tend to disclose less (e.g., Miller, 2002). This explanation stems 
from the idea that managers of better performing firms have capital market incentives to disclose 
more. However, it is not clear how this bears on the German private firm setting, where private 
financial statement disclosure to owners is required by law, so there is little incentive for firms to 
publicly disclose information to capital providers (e.g., Irani and Oesch, 2014).
21
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence of a previously unexamined proprietary cost of disclosure: 
the risk of product market predation. The empirical analysis exploits a setting in which (1) there 
are likely to be few nonproprietary costs of disclosure (such as agency costs) that could explain 
disclosure avoidance, (2) disclosed information is reliable, and (3) disclosure avoidance is likely 
to substantially affect the amount of financial information available to competitors. The results 
show strong evidence of an increasingly positive relation between financial constraint and 
disclosure avoidance, and cross-sectional tests show that this relation is stronger for firms with 
other characteristics that are associated with predation risk. Supplemental tests generally 
corroborate my interpretation of the results. 
Collectively, these findings provide novel evidence of proprietary costs of financial 
statement disclosure and the determinants and consequences of predation risk. The evidence 
suggests that financially constrained firms can minimize the cost associated with predation risk 
                                                        
21
 Before 2006, private disclosure requirements to shareholders were subject to substantially stronger enforcement 
than public disclosure requirements. Shareholders possessed well-enforced information rights regarding important 
planning decisions (e.g., investment decisions) and specific documents (e.g., contracts) in addition to the firm’s 
financial statements. See, for example, Oberlandesgericht Thüringen, Sept. 14, 2004 (Case 6 W 417/04). 
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by avoiding disclosure and preserving information asymmetries with potential predators. The 
results also build on prior studies that examine the relation between proprietary costs and 
profitability. Although prior work generally finds that more profitable firms incur higher 
proprietary costs of disclosure (e.g., Dedman and Lennox, 2009), my results suggest that this 
association is weaker among more financially constrained firms, consistent with the notion that 
less profitable, more financially constrained firms have higher predation risk. 
Future research can extend the findings in several ways. One way is to further explore 
evidence of predation following disclosure changes, which would extend the literature on the real 
effects of accounting and disclosure decisions (e.g., Badertscher et al., 2013). Future research 
could also explore the role of predation in the decision to go public, which is accompanied by 
extensive disclosures, or other disclosures of public companies that reveal important product 
market information. Another avenue would be to examine whether predation risk motivates firms 
to keep debt off the balance sheet.
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Appendix 
Disclosure and audit requirements in 2006 and 2007 
This appendix summarizes the public disclosure and external audit requirements for German private limited liability firms in 
2006 and 2007. Under the German Commercial Code, each firm is classified as small, medium, or large, and this classification 
determines its disclosure and audit requirements. Size classification is based on three variables: year-end total assets, annual 
sales, and average number of employees during the fiscal year. Firms are assigned to a larger size category when the values of 
two (or more) of the three size variables exceed bright-line thresholds set by the German government over two successive years. 
For example, a small firm becomes a medium firm as soon as at least two of three size variables exceed the threshold separating 
the small and medium classifications for two consecutive years. Similarly, a medium firm does not move down to the small class 
until at least two of three size variables remain below the small-medium threshold for two consecutive years (Bernard et al., 
2015). The small-medium bright-line size thresholds for German limited liability private firms in 2006 and 2007 were €4,015,000 
in total assets, €8,030,000 in sales, and 50 employees. The medium-large bright-line size thresholds were €16,060,000 in total 
assets, €32,120,000 in sales, and 250 employees.  
 
Small firms 
 
Balance sheet 
Required in abbreviated format (e.g., several subcategories of items—such as current and 
long-term liabilities—can be aggregated) 
Income statement Not required 
Notes 
Required in abbreviated format (items related to income statement accounts and details about 
balance sheet accounts can be omitted) 
Director’s report Not required 
External audit Not required 
 
 
Medium firms 
 
Balance sheet 
Required in expanded abbreviated format (e.g., some subcategories of items can be 
aggregated) 
Income statement 
Required in abbreviated format (items such as sales, other operating income, and cost of 
materials can be aggregated to gross profit) 
Notes 
Required in expanded abbreviated format (certain items related to aggregated accounts can be 
omitted) 
Director’s report Required in full format 
External audit Required 
 
 
Large firms 
 
Balance sheet Required in full format 
Income statement Required in full format 
Notes Required in full format 
Director’s report Required in full format 
External audit Required 
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Figure 1 
Evolution of the disclosure environment in Germany 
This figure presents a timeline of significant events and law changes related to limited liability private firms’ public disclosure requirements in Germany. Double vertical bars 
mark periods of time not to scale with the rest of the timeline. 
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Figure 2 
Disclosure avoidance and financial constraint 
This figure plots estimated margins and corresponding 95% confidence intervals of prior disclosure avoidance (no disclosure) 
for [−3 standard deviations, +3 standard deviations] of financial constraint (industry-adjusted leverage net of cash). No 
disclosure, the dependent variable, is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s first financial statement filing included in the 
Amadeus database is for its fiscal year-end on or after December 31, 2005, and zero if before. Industry-adjusted leverage net of 
cash equals the firm’s total debt net of cash, scaled by total assets, minus the mean of this ratio for all other private limited 
liability firms in the same four-digit NAICS code. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles and 
standardized to have a mean equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to one. Estimated margins are computed based on 
Equation (1), as estimated in Table 3, column 6.  
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Figure 3 
Disclosure avoidance and other costs and benefits of disclosure 
This figure plots estimated margins and corresponding 95% confidence intervals of prior disclosure avoidance (no disclosure) for [−3 standard deviations, +3 standard 
deviations] of relative operating profitability (industry-adjusted ROA), intangibility (intangibles), market concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman index), and firm size (natural log of 
total assets). No disclosure, the dependent variable, is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s first financial statement filing included in the Amadeus database is for its 
fiscal year-end on or after December 31, 2005, and zero if before. Industry-adjusted ROA equals the firm’s operating profits, scaled by total assets, minus the mean of this ratio for 
all other private limited liability firms in the same four-digit NAICS code. Intangibles equals the firm’s intangible assets, scaled by total assets. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is 
formed by four-digit NAICS code and constructed using total assets of German firms with publicly disclosed financial statement information. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles and standardized to have a mean equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to one. Estimated margins are computed based on Equation 
(1), as estimated in Table 3, column 6. 
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Figure 4 
Disclosure avoidance and interactive effects with financial constraint 
This figure plots estimated margins and corresponding 95% confidence intervals of prior disclosure avoidance (no disclosure) for [−3 standard deviations, +3 standard deviations] of financial 
constraint (industry-adjusted leverage net of cash) at representative values of relative size (10th and 90th percentiles of industry-adjusted natural log of total assets), relative operating profitability (10th 
and 90th percentiles of industry-adjusted ROA), public firm presence (public rival equals zero or one), and the propensity for ex ante sales contracting (ex ante contracting equals zero or one). No 
disclosure, the dependent variable, is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s first financial statement filing included in the Amadeus database is for its fiscal year-end on or after December 31, 
2005, and zero if before. Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash equals the firm’s total debt net of cash, scaled by total assets, minus the mean of this ratio for all other private limited liability firms in the 
same four-digit NAICS code. Industry-adjusted natural log of total assets equals the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets, minus the mean of the natural logarithm of private limited liability firms’ 
total assets in the same four-digit NAICS code. Industry-adjusted ROA equals the firm’s operating profits, scaled by total assets, minus the mean of this ratio for all other private limited liability firms in 
the same four-digit NAICS code. Public rival is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s four-digit NAICS code includes at least one public German firm and zero otherwise. Ex ante contracting is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is in a manufacturing industry (NAICS codes 31–33) that produces “differentiated products” based on the product homogeneity classification scheme in 
Rauch (1999) and zero otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles and standardized to have a mean equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to one. Estimated 
margins are computed based on Equation (2), as estimated in Table 4, columns 1−4.
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Table 1 
Sample selection 
This table presents the sample selection procedure. Data are obtained from the January 2012 version of Bureau 
van Dijk’s Amadeus database.  
 
German firm observations with fiscal year-ends December 31, 2006–December 30, 2007: 932,037  
Less observations of firms: 
 
without limited liability (91,975) 
without region, industry, or incorporation data (5,177) 
with total assets less than or equal to €4,015,000 (767,834) 
missing balance sheet or operating profit data (34,023) 
incorporated in 2005 or later (1,993) 
Final sample 31,035  
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the sample. Panel A presents the mean level of prior disclosure avoidance (mean 
of no disclosure) and the number of observations (N) in the final sample by industry (two-digit NAICS code). Panel B presents 
summary statistics on the independent variables included in Equations (1) and (2), including the continuous variables before they 
are standardized to have a mean equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to one. Panel C presents summary statistics on the 
continuous variables after standardization. Panel D presents Pearson correlations. No disclosure is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the firm’s first financial statement filing included in the Amadeus database is for its fiscal year-end on or after December 
31, 2005, and zero if before. Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash equals the firm’s total debt net of cash, scaled by total assets, 
minus the mean of this ratio for all other private limited liability firms in the same four-digit NAICS code. Industry-adjusted 
ROA equals the firm’s operating profits, scaled by total assets, minus the mean of this ratio for all other private limited liability 
firms in the same four-digit NAICS code. Intangibles equals the firm’s intangible assets, scaled by total assets. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman index is formed by four-digit NAICS code and constructed using total assets of German firms with publicly disclosed 
financial statement information. Public rival is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s four-digit NAICS code includes at 
least one public German firm and zero otherwise. High labor enforcement is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm operates 
in an industry subject to additional scrutiny under German labor laws (i.e., industries in the three-digit NAICS codes 113, 236, 
237, 238, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 721, and 722, as well as the four-digit NAICS codes 3116, 5612, and 5617) and 
zero otherwise. Sales missing is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm does not report sales and zero otherwise. East 
German is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is located in the former East Germany and zero otherwise. Income per 
capita equals the average disposable income of residents in the district where the firm is located (in thousands). Industry-adjusted 
natural log of total assets equals the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets, minus the mean of the natural logarithm of private 
limited liability firms’ total assets in the same four-digit NAICS code. Ex ante contracting is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the firm is in a manufacturing industry (NAICS codes 31–33) that produces “differentiated products” based on the product 
homogeneity classification scheme in Rauch (1999) and zero otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles and standardized to have a mean equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to one. 
 
Panel A: Mean of prior disclosure avoidance and observation count by industry Mean N 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 0.56 59 
Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction 0.57 46 
Utilities 0.28 892 
Construction 0.48 1,586 
Food and textile manufacturing 0.56 1,131 
Wood product, chemical, and nonmetallic mineral manufacturing 0.54 2,440 
Metal, machinery, electronics, transportation, and furniture manufacturing 0.54 5,397 
Wholesale trade 0.61 6,113 
Motor vehicle, furniture, electronics, materials, food, health, and clothing retail 0.62 995 
Sporting goods, general merchandise, miscellaneous, and non-store retail 0.61 241 
Transportation 0.56 1,243 
Delivery services and warehousing and storage 0.39 64 
Information 0.55 469 
Finance and insurance 0.55 249 
Real estate and rental and leasing 0.50 2,092 
Professional, scientific and technical services 0.57 2,017 
Management of companies and enterprises 0.61 2,144 
Administrative and support and waste management and remediation services 0.54 1,159 
Educational services 0.53 161 
Health care and social assistance 0.56 1,508 
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 0.45 246 
Accommodation and food services 0.54 173 
Other services (not including public administration) 0.58 508 
Public administration 0.37 102 
Total sample 0.55 31,035 
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Panel B: Unstandardized variables 10% 25% Median  75% 90% Mean 
Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash -0.43 -0.19 0.03 0.20 0.32 -0.01 
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.12 -0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.14 -0.01 
Intangibles 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.21 0.07 
Natural log of total assets 15.41 15.71 16.30 17.24 18.34 16.63 
Income per capita 15.23 16.27 17.98 19.42 20.84 18.05 
Year incorporated 1967 1979 1990 1998 2002 1986 
Industry-adjusted natural log of total assets -1.12 -0.76 -0.23 0.53 1.45 -0.01 
Public rival 0 1 1 1 1 0.81 
High labor enforcement 0 0 0 0 1 0.10 
Sales missing 0 0 0 1 1 0.35 
East German 0 0 0 0 1 0.13 
Ex ante contracting 0 0 0 0 1 0.22 
       Panel C: Standardized continuous variables 10% 25% Median  75% 90% Mean 
Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash -1.38 -0.61 0.13 0.68 1.10 0 
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.79 -0.40 -0.05 0.39 1.04 0 
Intangibles -0.33 -0.33 -0.30 -0.17 0.33 0 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index -0.58 -0.56 -0.43 0.01 1.26 0 
Natural log of total assets -1.03 -0.77 -0.28 0.52 1.44 0 
Income per capita -1.16 -0.73 -0.03 0.57 1.15 0 
Year incorporated -1.16 -0.43 0.25 0.74 0.98 0 
Industry-adjusted natural log of total assets -1.03 -0.69 -0.20 0.51 1.37 0 
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Panel D: Pearson correlation table 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 No disclosure - 
             2 Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash 0.02 - 
            3 Industry-adjusted ROA 0.05 -0.21 - 
           4 Intangibles 0.00 0.05 -0.04 - 
          5 Herfindahl-Hirschman index -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 - 
         6 Public rival 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 - 
        7 Natural log of total assets -0.15 -0.01 -0.11 0.12 0.02 0.09 - 
       8 High labor enforcement -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.06 -0.11 -0.16 -0.09 - 
      9 Sales missing 0.22 -0.08 0.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 -0.35 0.00 - 
     10 East German -0.11 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 - 
    11 Income per capita 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.49 - 
   12 Year incorporated 0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.00 0.17 -0.07 - 
  13 Industry-adjusted natural log of total assets -0.14 0.00 -0.08 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.00 -0.30 -0.03 0.04 -0.13 - 
 14 Ex ante contracting 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.23 0.01 -0.06 -0.18 0.08 0.01 -0.03 -0.09 0.00 - 
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Table 3 
Determinants of disclosure avoidance 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (1) using ordinary least squares. No disclosure, the dependent variable, 
is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s first financial statement filing included in the Amadeus database is for its fiscal 
year-end on or after December 31, 2005, and zero if before. Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash equals the firm’s total debt net 
of cash, scaled by total assets, minus the mean of this ratio for all other private limited liability firms in the same four-digit 
NAICS code. Industry-adjusted ROA equals the firm’s operating profits, scaled by total assets, minus the mean of this ratio for 
all other private limited liability firms in the same four-digit NAICS code. Intangibles equals the firm’s intangible assets, scaled 
by total assets. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is formed by four-digit NAICS code and constructed using total assets of 
German firms with publicly disclosed financial statement information. Public rival is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm’s four-digit NAICS code includes at least one public German firm and zero otherwise. High labor enforcement is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm operates in an industry subject to additional scrutiny under German labor laws (i.e., 
industries in the three-digit NAICS codes 113, 236, 237, 238, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 721, and 722, as well as the 
four-digit NAICS codes 3116, 5612, and 5617) and zero otherwise. Sales missing is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm 
does not report sales and zero otherwise. East German is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is located in the former 
East Germany and zero otherwise. Income per capita equals the average disposable income of residents in the district where the 
firm is located (in thousands). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles and standardized to have a 
mean equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to one. T-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using heteroskedastic-
consistent Huber-White standard errors. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed) levels are denoted with ***, 
**, and *, respectively.  
 
Model Predicted sign 1 2 3 4 5 6 
        Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash (+) 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 
  
(3.26) (4.31) (5.26) (5.21) (5.53) (6.53) 
Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash2 (+)    0.018*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
  
   (9.50) (6.00) (6.21) 
Industry-adjusted ROA (+)   0.016***   0.016*** 
  
  (5.59)   (5.88) 
Intangibles (+)   0.008***   0.008*** 
  
  (2.80)   (2.76) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (?)   -0.010***   -0.010*** 
  
  (-3.58)   (-3.56) 
Public rival (+)   0.010   0.010 
  
  (1.39)   (1.38) 
Natural log of total assets (–)  -0.042*** -0.041***  -0.041*** -0.040*** 
  
 (-14.15) (-13.88)  (-13.85) (-13.54) 
High labor enforcement (–)  -0.043*** -0.045***  -0.043*** -0.044*** 
  
 (-4.83) (-4.91)  (-4.76) (-4.83) 
Sales missing (+)  0.190*** 0.190***  0.189*** 0.189*** 
  
 (31.29) (31.11)  (31.18) (30.98) 
East German (?)  -0.161*** -0.157***  -0.160*** -0.156*** 
  
 (-16.86) (-16.40)  (-16.76) (-16.28) 
Income per capita (?)  -0.003 -0.003  -0.004 -0.004 
  
 (-0.85) (-1.02)  (-1.09) (-1.27) 
Year incorporated (+)  0.034*** 0.033***  0.033*** 0.032*** 
  
 (12.29) (11.92)  (11.91) (11.53) 
Constant (?) 0.554*** 0.514*** 0.505*** 0.536*** 0.503*** 0.494*** 
  
(196.40) (129.48) (71.00) (157.74) (115.00) (67.23) 
R2   0.000 0.068 0.070 0.003 0.069 0.071 
N   31,035 31,035 31,035 31,035 31,035 31,035 
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Table 4 
Cross-sectional tests of disclosure avoidance 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (2) using ordinary least squares. In columns 1 and 5, natural log of total assets is 
replaced with industry-adjusted natural log of total assets to ensure any main effect of industry-adjusted natural log of total assets does not bias 
the interaction term. For similar reasons, the main effect of ex ante contracting is included in columns 4 and 5. No disclosure, the dependent 
variable, is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s first financial statement filing included in the Amadeus database is for its fiscal year-
end on or after December 31, 2005, and zero if before. Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash equals the firm’s total debt net of cash, scaled by 
total assets, minus the mean of this ratio for all other private limited liability firms in the same four-digit NAICS code. Industry-adjusted natural 
log of total assets equals the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets, minus the mean of the natural logarithm of private limited liability firms’ 
total assets in the same four-digit NAICS code. Industry-adjusted ROA equals the firm’s operating profits, scaled by total assets, minus the mean 
of this ratio for all other private limited liability firms in the same four-digit NAICS code. Public rival is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm’s four-digit NAICS code includes at least one public German firm and zero otherwise. Ex ante contracting is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the firm is in a manufacturing industry (NAICS codes 31–33) that produces “differentiated products” based on the product homogeneity 
classification scheme in Rauch (1999) and zero otherwise. Intangibles equals the firm’s intangible assets, scaled by total assets. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman index is formed by four-digit NAICS code and constructed using total assets of German firms with publicly disclosed financial 
statement information. High labor enforcement is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm operates in an industry subject to additional 
scrutiny under German labor laws (i.e., industries in the three-digit NAICS codes 113, 236, 237, 238, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 721, 
and 722, as well as the four-digit NAICS codes 3116, 5612, and 5617) and zero otherwise. Sales missing is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the firm does not report sales and zero otherwise. East German is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is located in the former East 
Germany and zero otherwise. Income per capita equals the average disposable income of residents in the district where the firm is located (in 
thousands). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles and standardized to have a mean equal to zero and a standard 
deviation equal to one. T-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using heteroskedastic-consistent Huber-White standard errors. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed) levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 
Model Predicted sign 1 2 3 4 5 
       Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash 
 
0.014*** 0.015*** -0.002 0.019*** 0.003 
  
(4.83) (5.29) (-0.24) (6.21) (0.45) 
Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash × 
Industry-adjusted natural log of total assets 
(–) 
-0.012***    -0.012*** 
(-4.22)    (-4.23) 
Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash × 
Industry-adjusted ROA 
(–) 
 -0.006**   -0.007*** 
 (-2.54)   (-2.93) 
Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash × 
Public rival 
(+) 
  0.020***  0.019*** 
  (2.90)  (2.72) 
Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash × Ex 
ante contracting 
(–) 
   -0.022*** -0.021*** 
   (-3.30) (-3.16) 
Industry-adjusted ROA (+) 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 
  
(6.13) (5.52) (5.60) (5.51) (5.95) 
Intangibles (+) 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
  
(2.64) (2.80) (2.79) (2.82) (2.64) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (?) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
  
(-3.75) (-3.62) (-3.57) (-2.82) (-3.21) 
Public rival (+) 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.002 
  
(0.27) (1.38) (1.39) (1.43) (0.26) 
Industry-adjusted natural log of total assets (–) -0.038***    -0.038*** 
  
(-13.14)    (-13.03) 
Natural log of total assets (–)  -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.042***  
  
 (-13.72) (-13.88) (-14.08)  
High labor enforcement (–) -0.035*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.050*** -0.039*** 
  
(-3.87) (-4.90) (-4.90) (-5.35) (-4.18) 
Sales missing (+) 0.195*** 0.189*** 0.190*** 0.191*** 0.196*** 
  
(32.56) (31.09) (31.12) (31.23) (32.56) 
East German (?) -0.157*** -0.156*** -0.157*** -0.156*** -0.157*** 
  
(-16.47) (-16.33) (-16.43) (-16.37) (-16.38) 
Income per capita (?) -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
  
(-1.11) (-1.03) (-1.02) (-1.12) (-1.21) 
Year incorporated (+) 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
  
(11.57) (11.84) (11.96) (11.58) (11.28) 
Ex ante contracting (–)    -0.021*** -0.015** 
  
   (-3.07) (-2.22) 
Constant (?) 0.509*** 0.504*** 0.505*** 0.510*** 0.511*** 
  
(71.19) (70.69) (71.04) (70.25) (70.06) 
R2   0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.071 
N   31,035 31,035 31,035 31,035 31,035 
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Table 5 
First disclosure and the determinants of disclosure avoidance 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (1) using ordinary least squares, where column 1 excludes firms that 
first file December 31, 2006–December 30, 2007 and column 2 excludes firms that first file December 31, 2005–December 30, 
2006. No disclosure, the dependent variable, is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s first financial statement filing 
included in the Amadeus database is for its fiscal year-end on or after December 31, 2005, and zero if before. Industry-adjusted 
leverage net of cash equals the firm’s total debt net of cash, scaled by total assets, minus the mean of this ratio for all other 
private limited liability firms in the same four-digit NAICS code. Industry-adjusted ROA equals the firm’s operating profits, 
scaled by total assets, minus the mean of this ratio for all other private limited liability firms in the same four-digit NAICS code. 
Intangibles equals the firm’s intangible assets, scaled by total assets. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is formed by four-digit 
NAICS code and constructed using total assets of German firms with publicly disclosed financial statement information. Public 
rival is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s four-digit NAICS code includes at least one public German firm and zero 
otherwise. High labor enforcement is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm operates in an industry subject to additional 
scrutiny under German labor laws (i.e., industries in the three-digit NAICS codes 113, 236, 237, 238, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 
486, 487, 488, 721, and 722, as well as the four-digit NAICS codes 3116, 5612, and 5617) and zero otherwise. Sales missing is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the firm does not report sales and zero otherwise. East German is an indicator variable equal 
to one if the firm is located in the former East Germany and zero otherwise. Income per capita equals the average disposable 
income of residents in the district where the firm is located (in thousands). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles and standardized to have a mean equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to one. T-statistics (in parentheses) 
are calculated using heteroskedastic-consistent Huber-White standard errors. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
(two-tailed) levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 
Model Predicted sign 1 2 
    Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash (+) 0.017*** 0.020*** 
  
(5.26) (5.69) 
Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash2 (+) 0.008*** 0.016*** 
  
(3.89) (6.90) 
Industry-adjusted ROA (+) 0.017*** 0.011*** 
  
(5.58) (3.68) 
Intangibles (+) 0.005* 0.010*** 
  
(1.68) (2.82) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (?) -0.007** -0.011*** 
  
(-2.42) (-3.82) 
Public rival (+) 0.007 0.015* 
  
(0.88) (1.89) 
Natural log of total assets (–) -0.046*** -0.015*** 
  
(-14.73) (-4.97) 
High labor enforcement (–) -0.050*** -0.022** 
  
(-5.06) (-2.19) 
Sales missing (+) 0.193*** 0.177*** 
  
(27.97) (22.39) 
East German (?) -0.158*** -0.105*** 
  
(-15.73) (-10.77) 
Income per capita (?) -0.006* -0.003 
  
(-1.82) (-0.98) 
Year incorporated (+) 0.027*** 0.032*** 
  
(8.82) (10.44) 
Constant (?) 0.417*** 0.213*** 
  
(52.23) (25.95) 
R2   0.073 0.058 
N   25,895 18,979 
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Table 6 
Dimensions of market structure and disclosure avoidance 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (2) using ordinary least squares. In columns 1 and 2, CS variable is 
replaced with measures of product substitutability and cost of entry, respectively. In column 3, the interactions for substitutability 
and cost of entry with industry-adjusted leverage net of cash are added to the estimation tabulated in Table 4, column 5. No 
disclosure, the dependent variable, is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s first financial statement filing included in the 
Amadeus database is for its fiscal year-end on or after December 31, 2005, and zero if before. Industry-adjusted leverage net of 
cash equals the firm’s total debt net of cash, scaled by total assets, minus the mean of this ratio for all other private limited 
liability firms in the same four-digit NAICS code. Substitutability equals the negative of weighted-average operating return on 
assets of firms by four-digit NAICS code, where weights are based on firm size (total assets). Cost of entry equals the weighted-
average capital intensity of firms by four-digit NAICS code, calculated as the weighted-average ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets. Industry-adjusted natural log of total assets equals the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets, minus the mean of the 
natural logarithm of private limited liability firms’ total assets in the same four-digit NAICS code. Industry-adjusted ROA equals 
the firm’s operating profits, scaled by total assets, minus the mean of this ratio for all other private limited liability firms in the 
same four-digit NAICS code. Public rival is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s four-digit NAICS code includes at 
least one public German firm and zero otherwise. Ex ante contracting is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is in a 
manufacturing industry (NAICS codes 31–33) that produces “differentiated products” based on the product homogeneity 
classification scheme in Rauch (1999) and zero otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
and standardized to have a mean equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to one. For brevity, the coefficients and tests of 
statistical significance for control variables are suppressed in all columns. T-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using 
heteroskedastic-consistent Huber-White standard errors. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed) levels are 
denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 
Model Predicted sign 1 2 3 
     Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash 
 
0.014*** 0.014*** 0.001 
  
(4.98) (4.98) (0.20) 
Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash × Substitutability (+) 0.010***  0.007** 
  
(3.67)  (2.10) 
Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash × Cost of entry (+)  0.007** 0.001 
  
 (2.46) (0.20) 
Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash × Industry-adjusted natural log 
of total assets 
(–) 
  -0.012*** 
  (-4.13) 
Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash × Industry-adjusted ROA (–)   -0.007*** 
  
  (-2.96) 
Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash × Public rival (+)   0.018** 
  
  (2.54) 
Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash × Ex ante contracting (–)   -0.013* 
  
  (-1.67) 
Constant (?) 0.508*** 0.506*** 0.512*** 
  
(70.96) (70.96) (70.15) 
R2   0.070 0.070 0.071 
N   31,035 31,035 31,035 
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Table 7 
Financial constraint, disclosure avoidance, and ex post performance 
This table presents the results of several tests of ex post performance. Columns 1 and 2 examine the probability of survival; columns 3 and 4 examine the percentage change in 
cash holdings; columns 5 and 6 examine the percentage change in fixed assets; and columns 7 and 8 examine the percentage change in industry market share (measured based on 
total assets and four-digit NAICS codes). All changes are measured between the firm’s filing between December 31, 2006, and December 30, 2007, and its filing two or three years 
later. Survival is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm remains on the Amadeus database and zero otherwise. Values for %∆Cash, %∆Fixed assets, and %∆Market share are 
replaced with their respective decile ranks to mitigate the effects of outliers. Industry-adjusted leverage net of cash equals the firm’s total debt net of cash, scaled by total assets, 
minus the mean of this ratio for all other private limited liability firms in the same four-digit NAICS code. No disclosure is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s first 
financial statement filing included in the Amadeus database is for its fiscal year-end on or after December 31, 2005, and zero if before. Loss equals one for firms with negative 
operating profitability and zero otherwise. Tangibility equals the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Income per capita equals the average disposable income of residents in the 
district where the firm is located (in thousands). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles and standardized to have a mean equal to zero and a standard 
deviation equal to one. T-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using heteroskedastic-consistent Huber-White standard errors. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
(two-tailed) levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 
Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent variable Predicted sign Survival 
2 yrs 
Survival 
3 yrs 
%∆Cash  
2 yrs 
%∆Cash  
3 yrs 
%∆Fixed assets  
2 yrs 
%∆Fixed assets  
3 yrs 
%∆Market share  
2 yrs 
%∆Market share  
3 yrs 
                   
Industry-adjusted leverage 
net of cash 
(–) 
-0.013*** -0.027*** 0.211*** 0.239*** -0.148*** -0.151*** -0.085*** -0.153*** 
(-5.92) (-7.80) (8.22) (8.61) (-5.52) (-5.23) (-3.34) (-6.56) 
Industry-adjusted leverage 
net of cash × No disclosure 
(–) 
0.004 -0.000 -0.071** -0.109*** -0.050 -0.081** -0.034 -0.077** 
(1.23) (-0.02) (-2.11) (-2.99) (-1.42) (-2.13) (-1.00) (-2.46) 
No disclosure (–) -0.010*** -0.030*** -0.043 -0.047 -0.081** -0.101*** -0.045 -0.065** 
 
 (-3.68) (-6.71) (-1.23) (-1.25) (-2.38) (-2.76) (-1.40) (-2.19) 
Loss (–) -0.030*** -0.054*** -0.045 -0.248*** -0.802*** -0.724*** -0.687*** -0.579*** 
 
 (-6.88) (-8.10) (-0.89) (-4.45) (-16.32) (-13.40) (-14.60) (-13.26) 
Natural log of total assets (+) -0.016*** -0.029*** -0.076*** -0.127*** 0.072*** 0.074*** -0.141*** -0.096*** 
 
 (-9.77) (-11.91) (-4.21) (-6.46) (4.21) (4.01) (-8.47) (-6.19) 
Year incorporated (–) -0.007*** -0.023*** -0.077*** -0.076*** -0.052*** -0.044** -0.048*** -0.032** 
 
 (-5.09) (-10.77) (-4.48) (-4.15) (-3.27) (-2.57) (-3.12) (-2.28) 
Tangibility (?) 0.010*** 0.024*** 0.096*** 0.066*** -0.500*** -0.518*** -0.112*** -0.050*** 
 
 (6.71) (9.79) (5.22) (3.27) (-29.11) (-27.68) (-6.41) (-3.10) 
Income per capita (?) -0.002 -0.011*** -0.030* -0.032* -0.080*** -0.100*** -0.030* 0.000 
 
 (-1.47) (-4.69) (-1.75) (-1.73) (-4.66) (-5.38) (-1.81) (0.03) 
Constant  0.948*** 0.833*** 5.522*** 5.561*** 5.670*** 5.666*** 5.929*** 6.575*** 
 
 (466.55) (248.66) (206.69) (194.16) (220.63) (205.45) (242.64) (294.14) 
R2  0.010 0.020 0.006 0.007 0.048 0.049 0.017 0.020 
N  31,035 31,035 28,024 24,270 28,281 24,510 28,620 24,780 
 
